A Constitutional Blueprint for National Renewal: Reclaiming Foundational Principles for the 47th Administration
Executive Summary
This report examines the constitutional viability of key proposals outlined in Josiah Haltom’s “Freedom Cities, Jubilee Money & the End of Stupid Wars: A Non-Judgment Day Letter to the 47th Administration & Planet Earth.” It provides a rigorous legal analysis, grounded in an originalist framework, to demonstrate how these ambitious initiatives can be pursued within the existing constitutional structure of the United States. The report synthesizes constitutional provisions, Supreme Court precedents, and historical practices to delineate pathways for implementation, highlighting the necessary legislative and executive actions. It concludes that while significant policy and political will are required, a return to foundational constitutional principles offers a legitimate and compelling basis for national renewal, fostering local autonomy, monetary integrity, and a rebalanced approach to foreign engagement.
I. Introduction: The Imperative of Constitutional Restoration
A. The Vision for a “Non-Judgment Day” Future
Josiah Haltom’s vision for “Freedom Cities,” “Jubilee Money,” and the “End of Stupid Wars” presents an aspirational call for a fundamental reorientation of American governance and society. This proposal, while informal in its initial presentation, implicitly demands a rigorous, constitutionally grounded approach for its realization. The essence of this vision lies in a renewed commitment to core American principles, suggesting that many contemporary challenges stem from deviations from the nation’s foundational design. This report transitions from the broad strokes of Haltom’s vision to a detailed legal analysis, exploring how such a future can be constructed upon a restored constitutional foundation, thereby enhancing its legitimacy and practicality for any incoming administration.
B. Defining Constitutional Restoration: An Originalist Framework
The interpretive lens for this report is originalism, a theory of constitutional interpretation that posits the constitutional text should be given the “original public meaning that it would have had at the time that it became law”. This meaning is an objective legal construct, discernible from contemporary dictionaries, grammar books, other legal documents, and the historical context surrounding the provision’s adoption, rather than the subjective intentions of the Framers. This approach stands in direct contrast to “Living Constitutionalism,” which suggests that the Constitution’s meaning evolves over time in response to changing social attitudes, even without formal amendment.
Adopting an originalist framework is not merely a theoretical preference but a strategic choice for a “Constitutional restoration” agenda. The very concept of “restoration” inherently seeks to recover a fixed, prior state of meaning, which directly aligns with originalism’s core tenet of recovering the “original public meaning” as it was “fixed at the time each provision was framed, ratified, and made public”. A different interpretive approach, such as Living Constitutionalism, which asserts that constitutional meaning “changes over time” , would inherently undermine the premise of “restoring” anything to a prior, fixed state. Thus, by explicitly adhering to originalism, the report establishes a consistent philosophical and legal foundation that directly supports the overarching goal of constitutional restoration, providing the intellectual framework for the entire policy agenda.
Furthermore, a common apprehension regarding constitutional restoration or originalism is that it might lead to a rigid or inflexible interpretation of law, unable to adapt to modern challenges. However, originalism does not necessarily entail a static constitutional doctrine. Changes can occur due to new facts arising that require new doctrinal implementing rules, such as the application of the First Amendment to the Internet, or because vague provisions allow for doctrinal dynamism within the bounds of a fixed meaning. This clarification is crucial. It allows for an argument for restoration that is not rigid or backward-looking but rather one that re-anchors governance to foundational principles while still permitting practical adaptation to contemporary issues. This nuance is vital for making the “restoration” agenda palatable and practical for a modern administration, demonstrating that fidelity to original meaning does not preclude effective governance in the 21st century.
The originalist approach aligns with fundamental purposes of the U.S. Constitution, including setting up government institutions, dividing power among branches and between federal and state governments, restraining momentary passions, promoting the rule of law, ensuring certainty through writtenness, and facilitating intergenerational lawmaking. By grounding arguments in this objective original public meaning, the report aims to demonstrate that the proposed changes are not radical departures but rather a return to fundamental design principles, thereby enhancing their legitimacy and persuasiveness to a broad audience, including those within the executive branch and the judiciary.
C. Overview of the Proposed Pillars: Freedom Cities, Jubilee Money, and the End of Stupid Wars
The report will now proceed to analyze the three core policy areas proposed by Josiah Haltom: “Freedom Cities,” “Jubilee Money,” and “Ending Stupid Wars.” Each of these pillars represents a distinct yet interconnected avenue for national renewal. “Freedom Cities” explore the potential for new jurisdictional models to foster local autonomy and economic innovation, particularly on federal lands. “Jubilee Money” delves into the constitutional authority for monetary reform and debt rebalancing. Finally, “Ending Stupid Wars” examines the constitutional allocation of war powers and the limitations on presidential authority to engage in and terminate military conflicts. When viewed through an originalist constitutional lens, each pillar offers a critical step towards reasserting constitutional governance and addressing contemporary challenges within the framework intended by the nation’s founders.
II. Freedom Cities: Reclaiming Local Sovereignty and Economic Innovation
A. Constitutional Authority for Federal Land Disposition: The Property Clause
The concept of “Freedom Cities” often envisions the establishment of new, autonomous or semi-autonomous jurisdictions, potentially on federal lands. The constitutional authority for such an endeavor primarily rests with Congress through the Property Clause (Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2). This clause states: “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States”.
The federal government is a significant landowner, possessing approximately 640 million acres, which accounts for about 28% of the total land in the United States. This vast expanse is primarily managed by four agencies: the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the National Park Service (NPS), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and the Forest Service (FS). The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted Congress’s power under the Property Clause as “without limitations,” granting it broad authority over federal lands, including the explicit power “to dispose of lands” and “to transfer ownership of federal land to states”. Historically, federal land laws in the 19th century actively “encouraged western settlement through federal land disposal,” exemplified by acts such as the Homestead Act of 1862 and the Desert Lands Entry Act of 1877, although the emphasis shifted towards retention in the 20th century. It is important to note that states cannot unilaterally claim control over federal lands; any such efforts “without express approval of Congress, are likely to run afoul of the Constitution,” as state authority over federal lands within their borders must be granted by federal law.
The Property Clause thus provides a clear and expansive constitutional foundation for the federal government to dispose of its vast land holdings. This power, interpreted as “without limitations” by the Supreme Court, means that Congress possesses the inherent authority to transfer federal land for the purpose of establishing “Freedom Cities.” The historical precedent of land disposal, even if later superseded by retention policies, confirms the constitutional legitimacy of such an action. This analysis indicates that the primary barrier to establishing “Freedom Cities” on federal land is not constitutional authority, but rather policy choice and the political will of Congress to enact such transfers.
For “Freedom Cities” to be established on federal land, congressional legislative action is the sole constitutional pathway. The Property Clause explicitly grants Congress the power to “dispose of” federal lands , and the Supreme Court has affirmed this power as “without limitations”. Conversely, any efforts by states to claim control of federal lands “without express approval of Congress, are likely to run afoul of the Constitution”. This establishes a clear constitutional requirement: for “Freedom Cities” to be viable on federal land, they must be created through an act of Congress. Any executive action or state initiative without explicit congressional authorization would be constitutionally infirm. This directs policy recommendations towards a legislative strategy, emphasizing that the President’s role would be to propose and advocate for congressional action, not to unilaterally create these entities.
A significant concentration of federal land ownership exists in Alaska (60.9%) and 11 coterminous western states (45.9%), a factor that has “contributed to a higher degree of controversy over federal land ownership and use in that part of the country”. This geographical concentration of federal holdings suggests that the political impetus for federal land transfers, and consequently for the establishment of “Freedom Cities” on such lands, is likely to be strongest in these Western states. The historical “Sagebrush Rebellion” further underscores this regional dynamic. This implies that a strategy for advancing “Freedom Cities” should leverage this existing regional discontent and build a coalition of support from states and populations disproportionately affected by federal land ownership, framing the proposal as a solution to long-standing grievances and a means of promoting local development and autonomy.
B. Establishing New Jurisdictions: Precedents from Special Economic Zones and Charter Cities
While no direct constitutional analogue to “Freedom Cities” exists in U.S. law, various legal and conceptual precedents offer models for creating distinct jurisdictional entities. These examples range from federally authorized economic zones to local self-governing municipalities and the admission of new states.
Internationally, Special Economic Zones (SEZs), such as those in India and China, demonstrate how central governments can establish areas with delegated legislative authority, simplified procedures, and single-window clearances to promote economic activity. China’s Shenzhen SEZ, for instance, exercised delegated legislative powers to create specific regulations tailored to its unique circumstances, adapting laws to address development challenges and remove institutional barriers. However, the concept of such flexible legislative authority has raised questions regarding its constitutional basis and potential disruption of legal uniformity.
Within the United States, Foreign-Trade Zones (FTZs), established under the Foreign-Trade Zones Act of 1934, represent a federal mechanism for creating specific economic regulatory carve-outs. These zones allow foreign and domestic merchandise to be moved in for operations like storage, exhibition, assembly, and manufacturing without immediate customs duties, unless and until the merchandise enters U.S. customs territory for domestic consumption. FTZs remain subject to U.S., state, and local laws and are intended to stimulate economic growth and competitiveness by removing certain disincentives associated with manufacturing in the United States.
At the municipal level, U.S. Charter Cities adopt their own “constitutions,” granting them “additional authority to adopt laws regarding ‘municipal affairs’ that are different from state statutes, while still being consistent with the US and California Constitutions”. This “home rule” power is typically granted by state constitutions and requires voter approval. This demonstrates a principle of localized self-governance within a larger constitutional framework, allowing cities to reclaim local autonomy and expand their economic and fiscal independence.
The highest form of jurisdictional creation within the U.S. federal system is the creation of new states. Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1 explicitly states: “New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union”. This process requires the consent of affected state legislatures if the new state is formed from existing state territory, and new states are admitted on an “equal footing” with original states, meaning Congress may not impose conditions that diminish their equal sovereignty.
These precedents offer a spectrum of models for establishing distinct jurisdictions, though no direct constitutional analogue to a “Freedom City” exists. FTZs demonstrate the federal power to create economic zones with specific regulatory benefits. Charter cities illustrate how local entities can gain significant autonomy over “municipal affairs” through a formalized process. International SEZs provide conceptual models for delegated legislative authority, though their direct transfer to the U.S. federal system requires careful adaptation to avoid conflicts with U.S. constitutional principles like federalism and the separation of powers. The power to admit new states, while a high bar, underscores Congress’s ultimate authority over territorial governance.
The concept of a “Freedom City” must be carefully defined along a spectrum of jurisdictional autonomy to ensure its constitutional viability. The available information reveals a clear hierarchy of jurisdictional models in the U.S.: from federally authorized but constrained Foreign-Trade Zones , to state-empowered Charter Cities with “home rule” over municipal affairs , to the ultimate act of creating new states. A “Freedom City” cannot simply be an amorphous concept; its constitutional viability depends on precisely where it falls on this spectrum. If it seeks limited regulatory exemptions, similar to an FTZ, it is a relatively straightforward path. If it seeks significant self-governance over a broad range of issues, it would need to be either a charter city, requiring state action and voter approval, or, more ambitiously, a new state, requiring congressional admission and the consent of the affected state legislatures. The critical point is that the level of “quasi-sovereignty” directly correlates with the constitutional and political hurdles. A “Freedom City” proposal must specify its desired level of autonomy and then identify the corresponding constitutional pathway, recognizing that greater autonomy implies greater legal and political complexity.
The implementation of “Freedom Cities” with broad “delegated legislative authority,” as seen in some international SEZs, presents a significant challenge in reconciling this concept with U.S. federalism and the Supremacy Clause. While international SEZs, particularly in China, operate with “delegated legislative authority” to create specific regulations, they adhere to a “non-conflict principle” with higher-level laws. In the U.S., the Supremacy Clause dictates that federal law overrides conflicting state laws. If “Freedom Cities” are envisioned with broad “delegated legislative authority” from the federal government, this would raise significant federalism questions, particularly if these delegated powers infringe upon traditional state police powers or create a regulatory environment that conflicts with existing federal statutes beyond specific, limited exemptions, such as customs in FTZs. The recent overturning of the Chevron doctrine further suggests that Congress would need to be exceptionally precise in any delegation of “legislative” or regulatory power to these new entities, as broad, open-ended grants of authority are now more vulnerable to judicial challenge. This means that a “Freedom City” would likely operate under a complex interplay of federal, state, and its own local laws, rather than as a truly independent legal island.
C. Navigating Federalism: Constitutional Challenges and Opportunities for Quasi-Sovereign Entities
The creation of “quasi-sovereign” Freedom Cities directly engages the delicate balance of U.S. federalism. The U.S. constitutional system divides power between states, which possess general governmental authority within their borders, and the federal government, which has limited, enumerated powers but nationwide jurisdiction. This division serves as a fundamental check against the abuse of governmental power.
A foundational principle of U.S. federalism is that “every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory”. This “territorial jurisdiction was the baseline” understanding at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. Any attempt to carve out areas with distinct legal or economic regimes for “Freedom Cities” must carefully navigate these established powers of both federal and state governments.
The Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3), which grants Congress the power “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States” , would significantly constrain the economic autonomy of these cities. The Supreme Court has broadly interpreted this power to regulate intrastate activity if it is part of a “larger interstate commercial scheme” or has a “substantial economic effect” on interstate commerce. However, the Court has also set limits, emphasizing that Congress regulates “commercial activity” that “substantially affects interstate commerce,” not non-economic activity. Additionally, the Dormant Commerce Clause, an implicit prohibition, prevents states from enacting legislation that “discriminates against or excessively burdens interstate commerce”. This would apply to any “Freedom City” attempting to create protectionist economic policies that favor its own citizens or businesses at the expense of non-citizens.
States can assert “sovereign interests,” such as a violation of state law, or “quasi-sovereign interests,” which involve protecting their populace, to sue the federal government, although the latter has been judicially limited. This mechanism provides states with a means to challenge federal actions perceived as infringing upon their authority or the well-being of their residents.
The inherent tension between federal land disposition and state territorial sovereignty is a critical consideration for “Freedom Cities.” While Congress has broad power to dispose of federal land , the establishment of “Freedom Cities” on such land, particularly if they aim for “quasi-sovereign” status, immediately confronts the principle that “every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory”. If federal land is transferred to a new, non-state entity within an existing state, or if a federal “zone” is created that attempts to supersede state law, it could be seen as an infringement on state sovereignty, which is a “baseline” understanding of jurisdiction. This implies that for “Freedom Cities” to succeed and avoid protracted federalism disputes, their legal structure must either involve the explicit consent and cooperation of the host state(s), or they must be structured in a way that clearly delineates their jurisdiction without undermining the state’s traditional territorial authority, perhaps by being established as federal enclaves with specific, limited purposes.
Furthermore, the pervasive reach of the Commerce Clause acts as a significant limiting factor on “Freedom City” economic autonomy. Even if “Freedom Cities” are established with some degree of local regulatory autonomy, their economic activities will remain subject to Congress’s power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States”. The Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause, extending to intrastate activity that “substantially affects interstate commerce” , means that most significant economic endeavors within a “Freedom City” would likely fall under federal regulatory authority. This indicates that “Freedom Cities” cannot truly become isolated economic islands with entirely independent regulatory frameworks. Their ability to innovate economically will be constrained by federal commerce power, meaning any unique economic policies would need to operate within the bounds of federal law or seek specific federal exemptions, which could be challenged under the Dormant Commerce Clause if they discriminate against interstate commerce.
Opportunities exist for “Freedom Cities” if they are designed as experimental zones that complement, rather than fundamentally challenge, the existing federal-state division of power. This could involve leveraging federal land disposal and explicit congressional authorization that respects state sovereignty where applicable, potentially through models akin to enhanced Foreign-Trade Zones or new forms of federal-state compacts.
D. Governance Models: Integrating Decentralized Technologies and Direct Democracy within Constitutional Bounds
The integration of innovative governance models, such as blockchain technology and direct democracy, into the “Freedom Cities” framework presents both opportunities for enhanced transparency and efficiency, as well as significant constitutional challenges, particularly at the federal level.
Blockchain technology is promoted for its potential to create “more accountable and equitable systems of governance,” including secure identity management, transparent voting systems, and combating censorship. Federal agencies are actively exploring its use for managing identities, assets, data, and contracts. The current administration’s policy supports the “responsible growth and use of digital assets, blockchain technology,” emphasizing “open public blockchain networks,” “regulatory clarity and certainty,” and prohibiting Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs). Proposed legislation, such as H.R.6572, the “Deploying American Blockchains Act of 2023,” aims to promote U.S. competitiveness in blockchain, designating the Secretary of Commerce as the principal advisor for policy, tasked with developing best practices and supporting federal agency adoption. Despite these benefits, concerns exist regarding data portability, ill-defined requirements, key security, user collusion, and user safety in blockchain implementation.
Direct democracy, encompassing mechanisms like citizen initiatives and popular referendums, is an option in 26 states and the District of Columbia, reflecting a commitment to popular sovereignty at the state level. However, the U.S. Constitution “doesn’t permit initiatives or referendums” at the federal level. The U.S. Constitution was “designed to limit” direct popular influence, in contrast to state constitutions that “celebrated popular influence”. This fundamental difference in design implies inherent constitutional barriers to implementing direct democracy at a supra-local level within the federal system.
The constitutional barrier to replacing representative government with direct democracy at a supra-local level is fundamental. The U.S. Constitution, unlike many state constitutions, was “designed to limit” direct popular influence and “doesn’t permit initiatives or referendums”. It establishes a representative republic. While blockchain can facilitate “transparent voting systems” , using it to implement direct democracy as a primary governance model for a “quasi-sovereign” entity that transcends local municipal affairs would fundamentally clash with the federal constitutional design. This indicates that “Freedom Cities” could integrate direct democracy within a local governance framework (e.g., as a charter city operating under state law ), but any attempt to establish a new, higher-level jurisdiction based on direct democracy principles would likely be deemed unconstitutional as violating the “republican form of government” guarantee (Article IV, Section 4). The capability offered by technology, such as blockchain, does not override established constitutional design.
Furthermore, blockchain technology is primarily viewed as an enhancement tool for existing governance, not a replacement for constitutional structures. Both the current administration’s policy and proposed legislation (H.R.6572 ) emphasize the responsible growth and use of blockchain technology. The focus is on promoting U.S. competitiveness, providing regulatory clarity, and supporting federal agency utilization for purposes like “identity management,” “transparent financial transfers,” and “supply chain resiliency”. This indicates a federal embrace of blockchain as a technological tool to improve efficiency, transparency, and security within existing governmental and economic structures. It is not presented as a means to create entirely new, constitutionally distinct governance models that challenge the separation of powers or the representative nature of government. This implies that “Freedom Cities” could leverage blockchain for administrative efficiency, secure record-keeping, or even transparent local elections, but not as the basis for a fundamentally different constitutional order.
The demand for increasingly complex legislation, driven by ideological polarization and divided government, also impacts the feasibility of novel governance structures. Legislators often seek to constrain executive discretion by writing highly detailed laws. The overturning of the Chevron doctrine further incentivizes Congress to be more specific in its laws, delegating less broad power to executive agencies. This trend suggests that any congressional authorization for “Freedom Cities” would likely be highly prescriptive, limiting their autonomy and the scope of their delegated powers.
In summary, the integration of decentralized technologies and direct democracy into “Freedom Cities” presents both opportunities and constitutional challenges. While blockchain can enhance transparency and efficiency within existing governmental structures, its use to fundamentally alter the representative nature of U.S. governance would face significant constitutional hurdles, especially at the federal level. Direct democracy, while common at the state and local levels, is absent from the federal constitutional design. Therefore, “Freedom Cities” could experiment with these models within a local or state-delegated framework (like charter cities) but would likely be constrained by the overarching federal commitment to a republican form of government and the separation of powers.
Table 1: Constitutional Provisions and Legal Precedents for New Jurisdictions
| Constitutional Provision/Legal Precedent | Description & Implications for “Freedom Cities” |
|---|---|
| Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 (Property Clause) | Grants Congress broad, “without limitations” authority to dispose of and regulate federal territory and property. This is the primary basis for transferring federal land for “Freedom Cities.” |
| Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1 (Admissions Clause) | Authorizes Congress to admit new states. If “Freedom Cities” aspire to full statehood, they must follow this process, including consent of affected states if formed from existing territory. |
| Article VI, Clause 2 (Supremacy Clause) | Establishes federal law as supreme over conflicting state laws. Any “Freedom City” must operate within the bounds of federal law, and federal authorization can preempt state law where Congress has acted. |
| Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 (Commerce Clause) | Grants Congress power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. Economic activities within “Freedom Cities” would remain subject to federal regulation if they substantially affect interstate commerce, limiting their economic autonomy. |
| Article IV, Section 4 (Guarantee Clause) | Ensures a “Republican Form of Government” to every state. This clause would likely preclude any “Freedom City” from adopting a purely direct democracy model if it were to achieve a quasi-sovereign status that challenges the representative nature of U.S. governance. |
| McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) | Established the doctrine of implied powers for Congress, allowing it to enact laws “necessary and proper” for carrying into execution its enumerated powers. This could support congressional creation of “Freedom Cities” if deemed necessary for a legitimate federal objective. |
| Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) | Broadly interpreted the Commerce Clause, affirming Congress’s extensive power to regulate interstate commerce. This reinforces the federal government’s pervasive economic regulatory authority over any “Freedom City.” |
| United States v. Lopez (1995) | Limited the scope of the Commerce Clause, clarifying that Congress can only regulate commercial activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, not non-economic activity. This provides a boundary for federal intervention in “Freedom Cities” if their activities are purely local and non-commercial. |
| Clinton v. City of New York (1998) | Struck down the Line Item Veto Act, affirming that the President cannot unilaterally amend or repeal statutes. This indicates that any executive action to create “Freedom Cities” or grant them significant powers without explicit congressional legislation would be unconstitutional. |
| Foreign-Trade Zones Act of 1934 | Establishes federal Foreign-Trade Zones, demonstrating Congress’s power to create special economic areas with specific regulatory exemptions (e.g., customs duties). This provides a precedent for limited, federally authorized “zones.” |
| State-level Charter City Statutes | Illustrate how local governments can gain “home rule” authority over “municipal affairs” through state legislative action and voter approval. This is a model for local autonomy within a state’s constitutional framework. |
| International Special Economic Zone Models (e.g., India, China) | Offer conceptual references for delegated legislative authority and streamlined administration. However, direct application to the U.S. context requires careful adaptation to conform with U.S. federalism and separation of powers principles. |
III. Jubilee Money: Restoring Monetary Integrity and Economic Justice
A. The Exclusive Power to Coin Money: Congressional Authority and its Historical Interpretation
Any proposal for “Jubilee Money,” particularly one involving a broad revaluation of currency or a significant discharge of debts, must fundamentally rest on Congress’s exclusive power over monetary policy. The Coinage Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 5) grants Congress the power “To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures”.
This power is explicitly and exclusively vested in Congress. Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the Constitution directly “prohibits the states from coining money” and from emitting “Bills of Credit” or making “any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts”. This federal monopoly on currency issuance and regulation means that it is “illegal to create coins or currencies with the intent to compete with the official currency of the United States”.
The Supreme Court has interpreted Congress’s coinage power broadly, authorizing it “to regulate every phase of currency”. This extensive authority includes the power to: charter banks and endow them with the right to issue circulating notes, as affirmed in McCulloch v. Maryland ; restrain the circulation of notes not issued under its own authority, even by imposing prohibitive taxes on state bank notes ; make Treasury notes legal tender in satisfaction of antecedent debts ; require holders of gold coin or certificates to surrender them in exchange for other currency not redeemable in gold ; and abrogate clauses in pre-existing private contracts calling for payment in gold coin or foreign currencies.
However, a critical limitation exists regarding federal obligations. Congress cannot abrogate clauses in pre-existing contracts related to obligations of the United States itself. The Supreme Court reasoned that such an abrogation would render the government’s pledges “mere illusory pledges”. This distinction is crucial for any “Jubilee Money” proposal.
The concept of “Jubilee Money,” if it involves broad monetary revaluation or debt discharge, must be a federal, congressional initiative. The Constitution grants Congress the exclusive power to “coin Money, regulate the Value thereof”. States are explicitly prohibited from coining money, emitting bills of credit, or making anything other than gold and silver legal tender. Furthermore, it is “illegal to create coins or currencies with the intent to compete with the official currency of the United States”. This establishes a clear federal monopoly on currency issuance and regulation. Therefore, any large-scale “Jubilee Money” proposal, particularly one that involves a revaluation of currency or a broad discharge of debts through monetary means, must be enacted by Congress. This indicates that the President’s role would be to advocate for and implement such congressional legislation, rather than attempting unilateral executive action, which would be constitutionally challenged.
A critical distinction exists between private and federal debt in the context of congressional monetary power. While Congress’s coinage power is broad enough to “abrogate clauses in pre-existing private contracts calling for payment in gold coin” , implying a power to impact private debt through monetary policy, the information highlights a crucial limitation: Congress cannot abrogate “obligations of the United States” itself. The Supreme Court determined that doing so would render federal obligations “mere illusory pledges”. This is a vital consideration for “Jubilee Money.” If the proposal intends to forgive federal debt, such as Treasury bonds or federal student loans held by the government, it would likely face significant constitutional challenges under this precedent. The focus of any “Jubilee Money” involving debt cancellation would therefore need to be carefully structured to target private debt or be framed as a revaluation of currency that impacts private contracts, rather than a direct cancellation of the government’s own financial obligations.
B. Legal Tender and Debt Obligations: Lessons from the Legal Tender Cases
The landmark Supreme Court decisions known as the Legal Tender Cases provide powerful precedent for Congress’s authority to define legal tender and its impact on existing debts, which is highly relevant to any “Jubilee Money” proposal. These cases centered on the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act of 1862, which mandated that paper money, known as “greenbacks,” be accepted for the payment of debts during the Civil War.
Initially, in Hepburn v. Griswold (1870), the Supreme Court, by a narrow 4-3 vote, ruled the Act unconstitutional. Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, writing for the majority, argued that the Act violated the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause (as a “taking”) and the “spirit” of the Contract Clause. This decision was influenced by the political and economic context of the Civil War and was rendered by a Court that was not fully constituted.
However, following changes in the Court’s composition after President Ulysses S. Grant appointed two new members, the decisions in Parker v. Davis and Knox v. Lee (1871) reversed Hepburn by a 5-4 vote. These later decisions upheld the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act, affirming Congress’s authority to control currency as a “legitimate implied power under the Constitution”. This shift “clearly established the right of the U.S. government to pay its debts in paper money”. Justice William Strong, writing for the majority, emphasized important practical realities and the principle of avoiding retroactive changes in obligations, leading to a decision that upheld congressional control of the currency.
The robustness of congressional power to redefine debt obligations through monetary policy is a key takeaway from these cases. The reversal of Hepburn v. Griswold by Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis was a pivotal moment in U.S. constitutional law. It solidified Congress’s “legitimate implied power” to control currency, crucially extending to making paper money legal tender for contracts made before their passage. This is a profound point for “Jubilee Money.” It means that Congress has significant constitutional latitude to enact monetary policies that can alter the value or means of discharge for existing debts, even if those changes were not contemplated when the debts were incurred. This historical precedent provides a powerful legal basis for a “Jubilee” if it is structured as a redefinition of the monetary system or legal tender, rather than a direct “cancellation” of specific debts.
The enduring influence of judicial philosophy and Court composition on economic constitutional interpretations is also evident. The initial Hepburn decision was influenced by the “political and economic context of the Civil War” and a “Court that was not fully constituted,” while the reversal in Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis followed “changes in the Court’s composition under President Ulysses S. Grant”. This highlights a critical, often overlooked, aspect of constitutional law: the interpretation of broad powers, especially economic ones, can be highly sensitive to the prevailing judicial philosophy and the specific composition of the Supreme Court. While the Legal Tender Cases provide a strong precedent for congressional monetary power, any future “Jubilee Money” initiative, particularly one with significant economic implications, could still face intense judicial scrutiny. This underscores the need for a robust and well-articulated constitutional defense, recognizing that the political and judicial climate surrounding a “Jubilee” would be as crucial as the legal arguments themselves.
C. Constitutional Constraints on Debt Forgiveness: The Contracts Clause and Takings Clause
Any “Jubilee Money” proposal involving widespread debt forgiveness, particularly of private debt, must carefully navigate significant constitutional limitations, primarily those imposed by the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause.
The Presidential authority for debt forgiveness has faced substantial constitutional challenges. The Biden administration’s student loan forgiveness plan, for example, was challenged on the grounds that the executive branch “does not have the constitutional authority to wipe debt away” and that only Congress can appropriate money. A central argument in these challenges was the “major questions doctrine,” which requires “very specific statutory support when the executive branch takes sweeping action on issues of major significance”. The significant financial implications of the student loan forgiveness, involving “hundreds of billions” of dollars , clearly brought it under this doctrine’s purview.
The “major questions doctrine” serves as a definitive barrier to unilateral executive debt forgiveness. The challenges to the Biden administration’s student loan forgiveness plan highlight a critical limitation on executive power: the “major questions doctrine”. This doctrine requires “very specific statutory support” for “sweeping action on issues of major significance”. Given that the student loan forgiveness involved “hundreds of billions” of dollars , it clearly falls under this category. This indicates that any “Jubilee Money” scheme involving large-scale debt forgiveness—whether private or federal—cannot be achieved through unilateral executive action or broad interpretations of existing statutes. It would necessitate explicit and detailed congressional legislation to withstand judicial scrutiny. This shifts the burden of implementation entirely to the legislative branch, requiring a clear mandate from Congress.
Debt, by its nature, is typically established through contracts. Debt waiver or forgiveness contracts are legally binding agreements between a borrower and a lender, requiring clear terms, identification of parties, and “consideration” (something of value exchanged). This contractual foundation of debt is central to understanding constitutional protections.
The Contracts Clause (Article I, Section 10, Clause 1) states that “No state shall… pass any Law Impairing the Obligation of Contracts”. This clause was specifically intended to curb state debtor relief laws that undermined the sanctity of private agreements. While initially interpreted broadly to protect both private and public contracts, the Supreme Court’s decision in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell (1934) significantly narrowed its scope, allowing “emergency legislation” to modify contracts under a “rational basis” test. It is important to note that this clause primarily precludes retroactive impairment of existing contracts by states. It does not directly apply to federal government actions.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, however, applies to the federal government: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”. This clause is incorporated against states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Debt, as a legally recognized property interest (a right to repayment), could potentially be subject to a “taking” if summarily cancelled by the government. Legal scholarship suggests an interplay between the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause, where the prohibitions of the Contracts Clause might apply through the Takings Clause to prevent legislative schemes that shift the misfortune of the debtor to the shoulders of the creditor, even if attempted via eminent domain.
The Takings Clause acts as a federal constraint on debt cancellation, potentially requiring “just compensation.” While the Contracts Clause primarily limits state impairment of contracts , the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause applies to the federal government. Debt, as a legally recognized property interest (a right to repayment), could be considered “private property”. Therefore, if a “Jubilee Money” proposal involves the federal government directly canceling or significantly reducing private debts, it could be argued that this constitutes a “taking” of the creditors’ property (their right to repayment) without “just compensation”. Legal scholarship even suggests an interplay where the Contracts Clause principles could apply through the Takings Clause to prevent such shifts. This indicates that even if Congress were to pass a law enacting debt cancellation, it might still face constitutional challenges under the Takings Clause, potentially obligating the government to provide “just compensation” to creditors. This would dramatically alter the economic and fiscal feasibility of a “Jubilee” that aims to simply eliminate debt without cost.
In conclusion, a “Jubilee” must be structured to avoid these constitutional pitfalls, potentially requiring compensation for creditors or focusing on mechanisms that fall within Congress’s established monetary powers without constituting a direct taking of property.
D. Alternative Currencies and Taxation: Legal Frameworks and Implications
The “Jubilee Money” concept may also involve the introduction of alternative currencies or a re-evaluation of the existing monetary system. The legal framework governing private currencies and federal taxation is crucial in this context.
Private or complementary currencies are typically “not legal tender” and their use is “based on agreement between the parties exchanging the currency”. These currencies are often designed to address specific issues, such as stimulating local economies or increasing financial stability. However, there are clear legal prohibitions: it is “illegal to create coins or currencies with the intent to compete with the official currency of the United States”. Article I, Section 8, Clause 5 explicitly prohibits states and local governments from issuing their own currencies. While barter systems or “scrip” (vouchers) are permissible among agreeing parties, they cannot be generally circulated as competing currency.
The federal government holds a near-absolute monopoly on currency issuance and legal tender definition. The Constitution grants Congress the exclusive power to “coin Money, regulate the Value thereof”. States are explicitly prohibited from coining money, emitting bills of credit, or making anything other than gold and silver legal tender. This means that any “Jubilee Money” involving a new currency system cannot be a state or private initiative intended to compete with the U.S. dollar. It would require explicit federal authorization and integration into the existing monetary framework, or be limited to non-legal tender, agreement-based systems like barter.
Regarding taxation, the IRS has determined that “virtual currencies will be treated as property for purposes of U.S. federal taxes”. Therefore, general tax principles that apply to property transactions also apply to transactions using virtual currency. The constitutional basis for federal taxation is robust. Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 grants Congress the power “To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises”. More specifically, the Sixteenth Amendment explicitly grants Congress the power “to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration”. This amendment was ratified by forty states and proclaimed in 1913, and its constitutionality has been consistently upheld by the Supreme Court in cases such as Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R.. The IRS’s legality and authority to administer tax laws (Title 26 of the United States Code) are well-established, with due process ensured through mechanisms like the refund and deficiency methods. Frivolous anti-tax arguments, including those based on the Fifth or Thirteenth Amendments, have been consistently rejected by courts.
The pervasive reach of federal taxation is a significant consideration. The 16th Amendment grants Congress broad power to tax income “from whatever source derived”. The IRS treats virtual currencies as property for tax purposes. This indicates that even if new monetary systems or debt forgiveness schemes are implemented, any economic benefit derived by individuals or entities would likely remain subject to federal income taxation, unless explicitly exempted by Congress. This could significantly impact the net benefit and public perception of a “Jubilee Money” program, as any “forgiven” debt might be treated as taxable income unless specific legislative provisions are made.
Table 2: Constitutional Powers and Limitations on Monetary Policy and Debt
| Constitutional Provision/Legal Precedent | Description & Implications for “Jubilee Money” |
|---|---|
| Article I, Section 8, Clause 5 (Coinage Clause) | Grants Congress exclusive power to coin money and regulate its value. Any “Jubilee Money” involving new currency or revaluation must be a federal, congressional initiative, not state or private. |
| Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 (Prohibitions on States) | Explicitly prohibits states from coining money, emitting bills of credit, or making anything but gold/silver legal tender. Reinforces federal monopoly on currency. |
| McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) | Affirmed Congress’s implied power to charter banks and authorize them to issue circulating notes. Supports broad federal authority over the monetary system. |
| Legal Tender Cases (Hepburn v. Griswold, Knox v. Lee, Parker v. Davis) (1870-1871) | Affirmed Congress’s power to make paper money legal tender, even for pre-existing debts. Provides strong precedent for Congress to alter the means or value of debt discharge through monetary policy. |
| Fifth Amendment (Takings Clause) | Prohibits the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. If federal debt cancellation is interpreted as a “taking” of creditors’ property rights, it could require compensation, significantly impacting fiscal feasibility. |
| Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 (Contracts Clause) | Prohibits states from impairing the obligation of contracts. While not directly applicable to federal action, its principles may inform Takings Clause analysis for federal debt cancellation. |
| Sixteenth Amendment | Grants Congress the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes “from whatever source derived.” Any economic benefits from “Jubilee Money” (e.g., debt forgiveness) would likely be subject to federal income taxation unless explicitly exempted by Congress. |
| “Major Questions Doctrine” | Requires “very specific statutory support” for sweeping executive actions on issues of major significance. Unilateral executive debt forgiveness (e.g., student loans) is highly vulnerable to challenge under this doctrine, necessitating congressional legislation. |
| Prohibition on Competing Currencies | Federal law makes it illegal to create currencies intended to compete with the U.S. dollar. Limits the scope of private or alternative currencies to non-legal tender, agreement-based systems. |
IV. The End of Stupid Wars: Rebalancing War Powers and Promoting Peace
A. Constitutional Allocation of War Powers: Congress vs. President
The concept of “ending stupid wars” necessitates a clear understanding of the constitutional allocation of war powers between the legislative and executive branches. This division is a critical aspect of constitutional law, designed to prevent any one branch from unilaterally deciding to go to war, thereby ensuring a system of checks and balances.
Congress’s powers are enumerated in Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, which explicitly grants Congress the power “To declare War”. This clause is considered a cornerstone of the constitutional framework governing war powers, intended to prevent the President from unilaterally committing the country to war. Beyond declaring war, Congress also holds the power “To raise and support Armies,” with the crucial limitation that “no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years”. Additionally, Congress is empowered “To provide and maintain a Navy” and “To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia”. These provisions underscore Congress’s foundational role in initiating and sustaining military engagements through its power of the purse and its authority over the armed forces.
The President’s powers, conversely, are primarily derived from Article II, Section 2, which designates the President as the “Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces”. In this capacity, the President has significant authority over the military, including the power to direct military operations and make key decisions regarding national security.
Historically, there have been numerous instances where Presidents have exercised war powers without a formal declaration of war by Congress, such as President Harry Truman’s commitment of U.S. forces to the Korean War. These actions have often been justified by expansive interpretations of the Commander-in-Chief authority. In response to such executive overreach, particularly during the Vietnam War, Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (WPR). The WPR aims to restore the balance of power by requiring the President to notify Congress within 48 hours of committing U.S. armed forces to hostilities or imminent hostilities, and to withdraw those forces within 60 days unless Congress authorizes the use of military force or declares war. The constitutionality of the WPR has been disputed by several Presidents, who claim it unconstitutionally limits their executive power, but the Supreme Court has never definitively ruled on its constitutionality.
The congressional prerogative for war declaration is a fundamental aspect of the constitutional design. The Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power “To declare War”. This is a fundamental check on executive power, designed to prevent unilateral military action. Any initiative to “end stupid wars” must reinforce this constitutional division, emphasizing that formal declarations or explicit authorizations from Congress are prerequisites for sustained military engagements, rather than relying on broad interpretations of the Commander-in-Chief role. This requires a renewed commitment from both branches to adhere to the original constitutional framework for initiating armed conflict.
The War Powers Resolution, while its constitutionality is disputed by presidents, remains a contested but vital tool for rebalancing war powers. Its provisions, including the 48-hour notification and 60-day withdrawal limit without congressional authorization, provide a legislative framework for oversight. The ongoing tension surrounding the WPR highlights the need for a sustained legislative commitment to exercising its constitutional prerogatives and for the executive to respect these limitations, even in the absence of definitive Supreme Court rulings. This suggests that achieving a more restrained foreign policy requires not only presidential intent but also active congressional engagement in asserting its constitutional authority over war and peace.
B. Presidential Authority to Terminate Conflicts and Contracts: Legal Precedents and Limitations
The President’s authority to unilaterally terminate military conflicts and associated defense contracts is subject to significant legal precedents and limitations, underscoring that “ending stupid wars” cannot be achieved solely through executive fiat.
Regarding treaty termination, the President has the power to make treaties “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur”. While the President has the sole authority to negotiate treaties, the question of unilateral termination without Senate consent is contested. In Goldwater v. Carter (1979), the Supreme Court vacated a lower court’s judgment on presidential authority to terminate a mutual defense treaty, without reaching the merits, noting that the termination in that case accorded with the treaty’s terms. A presidential decision to terminate a treaty in violation of its terms would raise additional questions under the Supremacy Clause, which designates treaties as “supreme Law of the Land”. The majority of U.S. pacts with other nations are not formal “treaties” but executive agreements, adopted either pursuant to statutory authority or by the President acting unilaterally in limited circumstances (e.g., one-shot claim settlements, diplomatic recognition).
The President’s independent authority to end military operations beyond repelling a sudden attack is a long-standing debate. While the President, as Commander-in-Chief, directs military operations, Congress can authorize the use of military forces domestically to put down insurrections or execute civilian law when certain criteria are met. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 (WPR) attempts to limit presidential unilateral action by requiring notification and a 60-day withdrawal period absent congressional authorization.
The limitations on unilateral presidential action to end conflicts and contracts are significant. The President’s power to unilaterally terminate military conflicts or cancel defense contracts is considerably constrained. While the Commander-in-Chief role grants authority over military operations, it does not permit indefinite engagement without congressional authorization, as highlighted by the WPR. Furthermore, attempts to unilaterally cancel or delay federal funding (impoundment) are largely unlawful without explicit congressional approval under the Impoundment Control Act (ICA). The Supreme Court’s striking down of the Line Item Veto in Clinton v. City of New York reinforces that the President cannot unilaterally amend or repeal statutes, including appropriations for defense. This indicates that “ending stupid wars” cannot be achieved solely through executive decree; it requires legislative cooperation or adherence to established legal frameworks for withdrawal and contract termination, which often involve significant legal and financial repercussions.
Regarding federal funding and contracts, the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (ICA) is the primary legal mechanism for the President to seek to delay or permanently cancel federal funding once it has been enacted by Congress. However, the ICA requires the President to notify Congress for any deferment (temporary delay) or rescission (permanent cancellation), with rescissions requiring congressional approval. The President cannot unilaterally withhold appropriated funds due to policy disagreements without following ICA procedures. The ICA does not, in fact, allow for unilateral cancellation, only delay subject to congressional approval. Earlier efforts to give the President more control over spending, such as the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, were struck down by the Supreme Court in Clinton v. City of New York (1998) as violating the Presentment Clause, affirming that the President must approve or reject a bill as presented by Congress and cannot unilaterally amend or repeal statutes.
The “power of the purse” serves as Congress’s ultimate check on executive military and spending actions. Congress’s constitutional “power of the purse” (Article I, Section 9, Appropriations Clause) is a fundamental check on presidential military and spending actions. The ICA and the Clinton v. City of New York ruling underscore that Congress controls appropriations, and the President cannot unilaterally refuse to spend funds or cancel contracts without legislative consent. This means that while a President may initiate a withdrawal, sustained disengagement or termination of large-scale defense commitments, particularly those involving ongoing contracts, ultimately requires congressional action to defund or explicitly authorize termination, thereby shifting the responsibility for “ending stupid wars” to a shared executive-legislative effort.
Furthermore, unilaterally cutting off payments to defense contractors is highly problematic and likely illegal in most cases, constituting a breach of contract and a violation of the Prompt Payment Act, potentially resulting in substantial additional costs to the federal government. Decisions to deny payment to a contractor are typically made by the contracting officer, who is well-versed in the specifics of the contract, and contractors have an appeal process.
Therefore, “ending stupid wars” requires careful navigation of these constitutional and statutory limitations, primarily through legislative action or negotiation, rather than executive fiat. A President committed to this goal would need to work closely with Congress to secure the necessary authorizations for withdrawal, defunding, and contract termination, rather than attempting unilateral actions that are likely to be challenged and overturned.
V. Conclusions: A Path Towards Constitutional Restoration
The pursuit of “Freedom Cities,” “Jubilee Money,” and the “End of Stupid Wars” within the framework of constitutional restoration presents a multifaceted challenge that necessitates a deep understanding of U.S. constitutional law and its historical interpretations. An originalist approach, focused on the fixed original public meaning of the Constitution, provides a consistent and legitimate foundation for these proposals, asserting that they represent a return to fundamental principles rather than radical departures.
For Freedom Cities, the constitutional pathway lies primarily with Congress’s broad power under the Property Clause to dispose of federal lands. While the federal government owns vast tracts, particularly in the Western states, their transfer for the creation of new jurisdictions requires explicit congressional legislation. Any effort to establish these cities with significant “quasi-sovereign” autonomy must carefully navigate the delicate balance of federalism, respecting state territorial sovereignty and remaining subject to the pervasive reach of the Commerce Clause for economic activities. Furthermore, while blockchain technology can enhance transparency and efficiency within these new entities, any attempt to implement direct democracy at a level that fundamentally challenges the U.S.’s republican form of government would face significant constitutional barriers. The President’s role would be to champion and advocate for specific legislative action, rather than attempting unilateral executive creation.
Regarding Jubilee Money, Congress holds exclusive and expansive power over currency and legal tender under the Coinage Clause. This authority, affirmed by the Legal Tender Cases, provides a robust basis for monetary revaluation or the alteration of debt discharge mechanisms, particularly for private debts. However, the President cannot unilaterally forgive large-scale debt without explicit and detailed congressional authorization, as demonstrated by challenges under the “major questions doctrine.” Crucially, Congress’s power to impact debt does not extend to abrogating the financial obligations of the United States itself. Any economic benefits derived from “Jubilee Money” initiatives, including debt forgiveness, would also likely remain subject to federal taxation unless Congress provides specific exemptions. Therefore, a “Jubilee Money” program must be designed as a federal, congressional initiative, carefully structured to avoid unconstitutional takings of private property without just compensation and to respect the government’s own financial commitments.
Finally, the End of Stupid Wars requires a rebalancing of war powers, emphasizing Congress’s constitutional prerogative to declare war and authorize military force. While the President serves as Commander-in-Chief, historical executive overreach has led to the War Powers Resolution, a contested but vital legislative tool for reasserting congressional oversight. The President’s authority to unilaterally terminate conflicts or cancel defense contracts is limited; significant disengagement or contract termination typically requires congressional action, particularly through its “power of the purse,” or adherence to established legal frameworks that prevent unilateral impoundment or breach of contract. A President committed to ending protracted conflicts must engage in sustained legislative collaboration to defund operations and terminate commitments, rather than relying on executive fiat.
In conclusion, the vision for a constitutional restoration, encompassing Freedom Cities, Jubilee Money, and the End of Stupid Wars, is fundamentally achievable within the existing constitutional framework, provided that the executive branch operates in close collaboration with the legislative branch and respects the established separation of powers. The path forward demands a strategic focus on congressional action, a nuanced understanding of constitutional limitations, and a commitment to re-anchoring governance in the original public meaning of the U.S. Constitution.
